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EFFECTIVENESS OF GROUND-BASED DIRECT PILOT WARNINGS
IN MITIGATING RUNWAY SAFETY- CRITICAL HUMAN ERRORS
Peter M. Moertl
Kathleen A. McGarry
The MITRE Corporation
Center for Advanced Aviation Systems Development
McLean, Virginia
Three simulation studies were performed to determine opportunities and limitations of ground-based direct pilot
warnings to increase runway safety. Sixty pilots participated in these studies and operated a flight simulator under
active and passive warning. Passive warnings facilitated crew awareness about their current location on the airport.
Active warnings provided time critical information about runway status and other traffic to facilitate safety
mitigation behavior by pilots. Participants completed simulation scenarios with opportunities for safety incidents
that could be avoided if pilots achieved complete situation awareness. Warning effectiveness was measured by
comparing numbers of encountered safety incidents between baseline and warning conditions. Simulation findings
indicate that passive warnings are frequently unable to correct erroneous pilot expectations, thereby replicating
similar historic incidents such as the crash of a commuter jet in Lexington, Kentucky in August 2006, where the
flight-crew took off from a too short runway. Visual ground-based active warnings on the other hand seemed
effective in the runway entrance environment and for departure situations. For arrival situations, allocation of pilot
attention seemed to play a crucial role in moderating warning effectiveness. We report opportunities and limitations
of the described warning methodology and suggest next steps for runway safety research and system development.
Introduction
Runway safety is a high priority for the U.S. Federal
Aviation Administration. Various research programs
are currently investigating the possibilities of new
system designs, procedures, and technologies to
improve runway safety. The development of warning
strategies has received special attention in the context
of preventing runway incursions, and has been directly
proposed by the Department of Transportations’
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB, 2000) to
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). One such
research program investigates the development of direct
pilot warning systems to inform flight crews about
potential runway safety hazards. Such warning systems
are either located in the cockpit (cockpit-based
warnings), or on the airport surface (ground-based
warnings), and provide information about immediate
safety hazards to the flight crew. The studies described
here focus on ground-based warnings.
There is considerable agreement about the contribution
of human error as a primary causal factor for runway
incursions (e.g., Cardosi & Yost, 2000; FAA 1998).
Latent factors that are not directly visible to observers
contribute to the occurrence of unsafe acts which can in
turn lead to runway incursions and accidents. Adam &
Kelley (1996) surveyed 1437 pilots from two
commercial airlines and interviewed some of them to
accumulate a list of causal precursors to runway

incursions1. Beyond these latent factors, models of
organizational safety, such as Reason (1997), point to
organizational and workplace conditions that influence
the occurrence of unsafe acts. Therefore, human error
is only one dimension of causal factors contributing to
runway incursions.
Increasing operational safety can be accomplished in
multiple ways, one of which consists of warning
strategies, Lehto, (2006) lists several intervention
strategies to increase safety, for example: by product
design, task design, user selection, education, training,
and supervision. Warnings are here considered to be
supplemental ways to enhance safety and are seen as
part of the whole set of runway safety risk mitigation.
The first step here is to define the term “warning”. For
our purposes a definition by Laughery & Wogalters
(1997) is adapted: “Warning consists of information
that facilitates operators’ awareness of safety hazards
and enables them to make informed decisions to initiate
appropriate behavior to avoid the hazards.” We

1 The Federal Aviation Administration defines runway

incursions as “any occurrence in the airport runway
environment involving an aircraft, vehicle, person,
or object on the ground that creates a collision
hazard or results in a loss of required separation
with an aircraft taking off, intending to takeoff,
landing, or intending to land.” FAA (2005).
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distinguish between active and passive warnings.
Active warnings warn about time-dependent hazards on
the airport surface, such as other aircraft or vehicles.
Passive warnings warn about static hazards that do not
change over time, such as runways or areas where
frequent runway incursions have occurred (“hot spots”).
In addition, we distinguish between flight-deck based
warnings and ground-based warnings. Flight-deck
based warnings originate inside the cockpit, whereas
ground-based warnings originate outside the cockpit.
Flight-deck based and ground-based warnings can
either be active or passive. Examples for passive flightdeck based warnings include airport moving maps, and
runway awareness systems such as Honeywell’s
Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS).
Examples for active warnings include applications of
Automatic Dependence Surveillance Broadcast (ADSB), such as Final Approach and Runway Occupancy
Awareness (FAROA).
It is important to note that the term “warning” on the
flight-deck is generally used in a more specific context
than our proposed definition: that is (e.g., FAA 1987)
in the cockpit, warnings are defined as necessarily
associated with both auditory alerts and the color red, as
well as requiring immediate compensatory action by the
flight crew. In the cockpit, warnings are distinguished
from “caution” (auditory alert and associated color
yellow) and “advisories” (no auditory alert and any
other color). In this current context, however, it is
useful to utilize a wider definition of the term ‘warning’
that encompasses the rich operational information flows
that pilots rely on during airport operations to mitigate
runway safety hazards, and into which active warnings
need to be integrated.
The objective of the current research is to understand
the benefits and limitations of ground-based direct pilot
warnings independent of the development of cockpitbased direct pilot warnings. In particular, for what
situations may ground-based warnings be effectively
used, and under which situations may other safety risk
mitigation strategies be more appropriate?
Method
Sixty pilots participated in three human-in-the-loop
simulations to evaluate the effectiveness of various
ground-based direct pilot warnings. Warnings were
either visual or auditory, and were either passive or
active. Passive warnings were intended to enhance
pilot awareness and consisted of modified lead-on
lights, runway guard lights, and enhanced airport
surface markings, see Figure 1. All three warnings
were located at the entrance to the runway environment.

Modified
Lead-on
Lights
In-Pavement
Runway
Guardlights
Enhanced
Hold-short
Markings
Figure 1. Passive Warnings Included Airport Surface
Markings and Lightings
Active warnings consisted of three visual warning
systems. Runway entrance lights (RELs) consisted of a
row of red lights in the center of the taxiway that
warned flight crews about entering an occupied runway.
Take-off hold lights (THLs) consisted of red lights to
warn pilots in take-off situations about other aircraft on
the runway. Arrival warning lights (AWLs) consisted
of lights warning pilots when approaching an unsafe
runway, see Figure 2. In one warning configuration,
arrival warnings were part of the precision approach
path indicator lights (PAPI) that pilots use under visual
landing conditions to determine their appropriate
approach path angle. In this configuration, the PAPI
lights were continuously lit for approaching aircraft and
started pulsing to indicate an arrival warning. Active
warnings also included auditory warnings in the cockpit
that alerted a cockpit crew that a runway conflict was
ahead. Warnings were played in the aircraft’s speaker
system and included the aircraft callsign and the
message “warning, runway unsafe”.
In all three simulations pilots operated a flight simulator
under different safety levels, either with or without
warnings. The flight crew was instructed to follow air
traffic control clearances via radio. To measure safety
performance, simulation scenarios contained the
potential for runway safety conflicts. Safety conflicts
included the air traffic controller providing a departure
clearance that could lead to a conflict. Background
radio communication provided clues to the flight crews
that this clearance could lead to a safety critical
situation. This manipulation was intended to test
whether the warnings can help alleviate situations
where pilots do not have sufficient situation awareness
to avoid a safety critical situation, and compare this to a
baseline where pilots might not be able to gain the
necessary situation awareness in order to mitigate the
safety hazard without warnings.
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because he was unable to see an aircraft on the runway,
and delayed the abort until it was too late. Arrival
warnings reduced the number of safety incidents from
16 to 6. The six pilots who continued their arrivals
reported not noticing the warning lights. The auditory
warning further reduced the number of runway safety
incidents to one. The one pilot who continued the
arrival with the auditory warning heard the warning,
and initiated a hazardous compensatory action that
resulted in an unsafe runway safety situation.

Arrival
Warning
Lights
Figure 2. Active Warnings Included Airport Surface
Lights Indicating Runway Occupancy

Frequency of Safety Incidents per Simulation
Condition

Number of Safety
Incidents

30

In all three simulations, participants consisted of pilots
with mixed flight experience who operated the
simulator in a crew setting (simulation 3) or single
operations (simulation 1 and 2).
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Study 1
In the first study, three levels of warnings were
evaluated. In the baseline level (I), pilots operated the
aircraft on an airport that approximated existing
operational safety levels without additional warnings.
At the visual warning level (II), pilots were exposed to
visual active and passive warnings in the runway
entrance environment, and on the runway. For arrivals,
PAPI lights were placed on either one side of the
runway. In the auditory warning level (III), pilots
received auditory warnings in addition to visual
warnings.
The results of the simulation indicated that warnings
increased the safety of runway operations, as counted
by the number of safety incidents in each condition, see
Figure 3.
The number of safety incidents was
statistically significantly reduced in the warning
conditions compared to the baseline condition (p <0.05
using a McNemar-test). Warnings given by RELs
helped pilots avoid all runway safety incidents in
runway crossing situations. In the baseline condition,
14 pilots entered an occupied runway, but no pilots
entered the runway when visual warnings were
provided.
Warnings that were given by THLs reduced the number
of safety incidents from 28 to 5. The five pilots who
continued their departures after the THLs illuminated
reported not noticing the lights. Auditory warnings
again decreased the number of incidents from 5 to 1.
The one pilot who initiated a take-off despite hearing
the warning was hesitant about aborting the take-off

Figure 3. Occurrence of Simulation Incidents as
Function of Warning Levels
The simulation findings also brought insight into the
limitation of passive runway warnings, showing
similarities to a recent runway safety incident that
happened subsequent to the study. At Lexington,
Kentucky, in August 2006, a commuter jet mistakenly
departed from a runway too short for the aircraft. It
crashed, killing 49 people. The flight-crew took off
from runway 26 instead of main runway 22. In our
simulation, precursors for this incident were
investigated in one scenario where pilots were
positioned at an unexpected location on the simulated
airfield. This location was different from where the
pilots expected to be. The pilot was then given a takeoff clearance on the presumed closest runway.
However, the closest runway (35R) was different from
the runway participants expected to take off from
(17L). Pilots had passive warning information at their
disposal to detect the hazard of departing on an
incorrect runway. There was taxiway and runway
signage, as well as hold-short markings and runway
markings indicating the runway they were actually on.
By processing that information, pilots should have been
able to determine that they were about to take-off on a
runway from which they were not cleared. Also, pilots
could use the heading indicator on their cockpit display
to determine their direction on the airport.
Of the 36 pilots in this scenario, 22 pilots initiated a
take-off maneuver on the wrong runway, effectively
disregarding the passive warning information. The
other 14 pilots used the available information to correct
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their initially faulty expectation and did not initiate the
take-off. Specifically, five pilots used the heading
information on their flight display, three pilots relied on
runway and taxiway signage, and one pilot used the
runway markings to determine the mismatching
runway2, see Figure 4

arranged on each side of the centerline (III). After
presentation of the scenario in an approximated realistic
airport environment but without background traffic,
participants completed a survey and responded to
interview questions to determine the limitations and
benefits of the different configurations.

I

Correction of Erroneous Expection Using
Passive Warning Information

Number of Pilots

25
20
15
10

II

5
0

Used Passive Warning Unable to Use Passive
to Correct Incorrect
Warning to Correct
Expectation
Incorrect Expectation

Figure 4. Number of Pilots Correcting an Incorrect
Runway Expectation
The simulation findings indicate that active visual and
auditory warnings in general increased runway safety, by
reducing the likelihood that pilots with incomplete
situation awareness encounter safety incidents. Visual
warnings however, were sometimes not detected by
pilots. Auditory warnings were generally effective, and
always detected by pilots, but pilots sometimes initiated
hazardous compensatory behavior as a result of the
warning. It may be possible that cross-modal processing
of auditory information during a mostly visual task may
lead to this finding, though this hypothesis awaits further
confirmation. The simulation findings also indicate that
passive warnings have limited capability to correct
erroneous expectations of pilots.
Study 2
In study one, five pilots did not notice the illumination of
THLs. Study two then focused on identifying benefits and
limitations of alternative THL configurations. In study
two, twelve pilots were presented with departure scenarios
with three different THL configurations. First, lights were
arranged in one row of lights that were offset from the
centerline lighting (see I in Figure 5). Second, lights were
arranged in two rows of lights, one on each side of the
center line halfway between the centerline lighting and
runway edge (II). And third, three rows of lights were

III

Figure 5. Alternative THL Lighting Configurations for
Study 2
Pilots commented that THLs in configuration I were
ambiguous, and similar to runway-remaining lights.
Runway-remaining lights consist of a row of red lights
placed in the last 1000 feet of a runway, and are used
by pilots as an indication that the end of the runway is
close (see Figure 6). Runway-remaining lights replace
the otherwise white runway centerline lights and have
different implications for the flight crew than THLs.
Pilot comments were compatible with observations
during the simulation, where observers identified
several cases in which pilots misidentified THLs in
configuration I with runway-remaining lights.

2 The other five pilots did not indicate how they

Figure 6. Simulation Representation of Runway
Remaining Lights

corrected their location expectation.
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Difference in Go-around Initiation Distance Between
Baseline and AWL Condition

Overall, pilots indicated on surveys that configuration
III was the easiest to detect, and best facilitated the
intended action of stopping an unsafe take-off roll
because of the lateral arrangement. Pilots did not
identify limitations of configurations II and III.

8000

Distance from Runway (feet)

7000

Study 3
Results from study 1 showed that during arrival
operations, six pilots continued to land despite the
illumination of AWLs. This was, according to pilot
reports, the consequence of increased focus inside the
cockpit, as well as attention allocation on the runway
itself. The AWL consisted of flashing PAPIs that were
mounted at the side of the runway. To address this
limitation, a second arrival warning configuration was
designed and tested. This new lighting design contained
two lighting configurations: PAPIs at the side of the
runway, and THLs located on the runway itself.
Twelve pilots participated in study 3 and operated the
flight simulator with a pilot-not-flying (PNF) on the
right seat. The PNF completed regular crew work that
included checklists and communication with air traffic
control (ATC) but did not help the pilot flying (PF) in
decision making concerning runway safety. Similar to
study one, other aircraft were simulated on the airport
that correlated to the radio communications participants
heard. Participants performed departure, arrival, and
taxi operations on two simulated airports: Louisville
International Standiford field (SDF) and Los Angeles
International airport (LAX).
Results indicated that the addition of a second lighting
configuration to the arrival warning was effective; all
pilots saw the warning and initiated a go-around. In
addition, the distance of the go-around initiation
significantly increased from 3744 feet in the baseline
condition, to 6557 feet in the arrival warning condition,
facilitating earlier conflict avoidance, see Figure 7.
Though the placement of arrival warning lights on the
runway showed safety benefits for arrival operations,
operational issues were encountered when using the
same lighting system (THLs) for departure operations.
In some cases, departing aircraft misinterpreted THLs
as applicable to arrival aircraft and continued their takeoff. This indicates an apparent problem of pilots
establishing an accurate mental model about the
functioning of THLs in order to distinguish between
warnings that are intended for arrivals and those
intended for departures. This further indicates that an
integration of take-off hold lights as departure and
arrival warnings is not a desirable design solution.

6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
Baseline

AWL

Figure 7. Difference in Go-around Initiation as
Response to Arrival Warning Lights (AWL) Versus
Baseline Condition
In study 3, an eye-tracker was used to determine the
amount of attention pilots allocated inside the cockpit
versus out-the-window as a function of departure,
arrival, and taxi operations. The details of these results
are described by McGarry & Moertl (2006), who find
that pilots spent about a third less time looking out-thewindow during arrival scenarios as compared to
departure and taxi operations. This poses significant
concern for the effectiveness of ground-based visual
arrival warnings because pilots’ increased head-down
time in the cockpit may reduce the likelihood of timely
detection of the arrival warnings. Results from study 1,
where not all pilots detected the arrival warnings,
support these findings.
In addition to arrival warnings, study 3 explored the use
of RELs at closely spaced parallel runways, such as at
LAX, where an aircraft exiting one runway can
immediately enter the second, parallel runway.
Runway incursions have occurred where flight crews
have continued across the parallel runway that, at the
time was occupied by another departing or arriving
aircraft. RELs in this scenario may provide a warning
about the closely spaced parallel runway. However,
due to higher taxi speed and the small space between
the runways, the flight crew may not be able to
recognize and respond to the warning as effectively as
at other locations. Indeed, in the simulation it was
found that in one case a pilot, after exiting the runway
after a landing, continued to taxi through the
illuminated RELs, across the parallel runway where a
departure had been cleared for take-off. Compared to
the baseline condition, RELs reduced the number of
safety incidents slightly, from 2 incidents in the
baseline condition to one incident in the warning
condition. Taken together with the findings in study 1,
RELs show a somewhat reduced effectiveness for
closely spaced parallel runway situations.
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Summary and Conclusions
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Overall, direct pilot warnings provide only one layer of
protection against runway incursions and collisions.
We found in our studies that the auditory stimulation
inside the cockpit is a rich one that makes it hard for
pilots
to orient
themselves
through
radio
communication about the intent and location of other
aircraft on the airport. We observed that flight crews
frequently filter out information that is only applicable
to them and disregard communication and clearances to
other aircraft. This can lead to incomplete situation
awareness about airport surface movements, and
thereby reduce the likelihood of runway safety problem
detection when other pilots or air traffic controllers may
commit errors.
Runway safety is a complex issue that involves many
contributing factors (see e.g. Adam & Kelley, 1996).
Other strategies may include procedural changes in
surface operations, and changes in the task distribution
of flight crews and air traffic controllers for the
management and implementation of airport surface
movement. Such alternatives may include systems that
assist pilots and controllers in the development,
surveillance, monitoring, and communication of surface
movement. Such operational changes in airport surface
operations will require time but steps have been set by
U.S. governmental agencies in the development of
surface management systems (SMS), the deployment of
improved position reporting in the National Airspace
through ADS-B, as well as through the deployment of
the Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model X
(ASDE-X) in airport control towers.
Future
development efforts will need to integrate the separate
development activities to facilitate the change in the
tasks and responsibilities of air traffic controllers and
pilots that will ultimately facilitate a safe airport
surface environment.
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